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Grand Victoria Casino Elgin reviews Rate this attraction. TripAdvisor traveler rating. My wife's choice when she's feeling lucky. The atmosphere is nice and the interior is fully non-smoking. All visits vary based on concurrent players, so your mileage may vary but it is generally nice and reasonably quiet for a casino of its size. The only downside is that the odds are typically not that player-favoring and that can be discouraging it you go in with a lower set budget to play on that visit.

I love the food and wonderful restaurants. Fresh caught salmon served with spinach and capers. A lot of choices to please all palates. Service is awesome. Just very tight if your going there to gamble. You're better off spending your money at the fine dining. Pretty good odds on roulette and poker. Just fun if you want to get out for a bit with friends and family.

Great eateries in there. Pretty top of the line food. Just remember, know when to hold em and fold em and you'll already walk away with at least your money back. It's fun. Went to buffet for crab legs. Staff was very nice. We enjoy going to the casino we go often but recently I have had surgery and needed a wheel chair and a walker. It was a very awful experience people who need these things to get around have a hard time getting access to all the machines there is no room to get to all the machines.

You really need to make more room in between isles. The bottom level has a lot of space that could be used. Not handicap friendly. Plan your trip to Elgin Get a personalized trip A complete day by day itinerary based on your preferences. Start planning. The night the two-year-old boy was allowed to board the Grand Victoria, plaintiff was on duty as a slot shift manager.

She was notified via radio by floor person Dan Smallwood that the minor and his parents were on the gaming floor. Working from her electric cart, Moreno moved to their location and found Smallwood and Jeff Thorpe, a temporary assistant slot shift manager, with the parents and the little boy.

Thorpe told Moreno that he had called security supervisor Debbie Bakke to advise her of the situation and that a security officer was on his way. Plaintiff then told the minor's parents who spoke broken English that they were going to be escorted off the boat because children were not allowed on board.

The parents allegedly responded that they did not understand, and that they were going to stay and play. Moreno again informed them that they needed to leave. Security officer Jason then arrived. He called surveillance to advise them that he would be escorting the family off the vessel, which he did. Plaintiff got back into her cart, went around by the main door and saw that the family was properly escorted off the vessel and then returned to her duties.

At approximately a. General manager Jim Thomason allegedly made the decision to terminate plaintiff based on his own assessment of the child incident and the input of his managers. Thomason felt that plaintiff's response was not sufficiently "immediate" and that the final sentence of her statement was "totally inappropriate" and a "smart aleck comment.

According to defendant, Thomason was aware of plaintiff's knee surgery, but was unaware that the injury was workrelated or that plaintiff may have had rights under the Jones Act in connection with her accident. Other assessments of Moreno's conduct vary dramatically. According to McGill, her discussions with Moreno suggested that plaintiff knew the seriousness of a child being at a slot machine pushing buttons and that her decision nonetheless to stand by the child and wait for a security guard to come without taking any other action was an insufficient response.

McGill wanted to discuss the incident with Meyer despite the fact that she does not typically get involved with employee disciplinary matters. Meyer testified that he believed Moreno had acted inappropriately, though, according to plaintiff, Meyer did not want her to be fired. Plaintiff also presents the deposition testimony of Joseph Thomas, an agent of the Illinois Gaming Board, who was surprised to learn that plaintiff had been fired.

Thomas' official investigation included viewing the surveillance video tapes of the incident and interviewing plaintiff and the other staff involved. It was his impression "[t]hat she had done nothing wrong and Moreno had done everything properly; and that the termination was not necessary.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kaufman, F. We will make all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Adickes v. Summary judgment should be granted if it is clear that the plaintiff could not carry her burden of persuasion at trial on one or more elements of her claim.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. Under the general maritime law ship owners have a duty to provide their crew with a seaworthy vessel. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc. Negligent orders, insufficient crew members and assigning too few crew members to a job may deem a vessel unseaworthy, Mascola v.

Pacific Coast Transport Co. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. Canal Barge Co. Vest, F. Amerind Shipping Corp. Ohio River Co. Bemoaning "[d]efendant's congeries of negligent acts," plaintiff argues that the Grand Victoria was unseaworthy because its gaming equipment was unsafe, especially given the volatile combination of alcohol and rowdy passengers; because it was undermanned during the period when the guard-escort procedure was discontinued; and because John-Martin Meyer and other supervisors were incompetent.

The primary dispute here concerns the design of the upright slot machines. Alternatively, it should have continued the guard-escort procedure to protect employees during hopper fills. She submits the deposition of Larry Lambert, defendant's former slot technician, who testified to the suspicious and often violent reactions of casino patrons, noting that he regularly repaired the glass windows on these machines after they were shattered by angry customers.

Lambert also explained that the door on the upright machine has a tendency to swing closed, bumping any employee in its path. He noted that unlike the slot floor personnel doing a hopper fill, his hands were free to help protect him from the swinging door. He testified that he knew of upright slot machines manufactured with an additional support arm to keep the door from closing.

His testimony also bolsters defendant's position, however, that "most of the upright slot machines in the casino industry are the ones made by IGT" and which are not manufactured with dampers or safety locks on the door. Plaintiff responds that merely meeting an industry standard is not a sufficient defense. See Weeks v. Alonzo Cothron, Inc. Seacoast Co. Of course, the most colorful statement of this principle appears in Judge Learned Hand's seminal opinion, The T.

Hooper, 60 F. According to Judge Hand:. Although we see important differences between weather radios for boats at sea and safety latches for slot machine doors, we must leave it to the jury to determine whether the upright machines were "reasonably fit" to permit the seaman to perform her task with reasonable safety. See Grillea v. We do not believe plaintiff has presented facts to support an independent finding of unseaworthiness on the basis that the ship was undermanned or manned by incompetent personnel.

The temporary discontinuation of the guard-escort procedure, alone, did not render the ship unfit for gaming. Similarly, we conclude that plaintiff has presented no evidence to suggest that incompetent supervisors rendered the vessel unfit for its intended use. Plaintiff argues that the management team was incompetent because it required employees to conduct hopper fills under unsafe conditions, but defendant has shown that these machines were standard throughout the gaming industry in the midwest and slot machines must be refilled.

Thus, the issue here is not the competence of supervisors, it is the design of the doors and the alleged necessity, in light of this design, for additional safeguards such as the guard-escort procedure or dampers. Finally, Meyer's single instruction to Moreno to perform secondary hopper fills, even if negligent, did not violate the employer's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. See Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. While Mascola, supra, might suggest a different result, it was decided before Usner, and a close reading reveals that the Second Circuit was concerned principally with a finding of negligence under the Jones Act.

When the Jones Act was adopted in it extended to seamen the right of recovery against their employers that railroad employees already enjoyed. The Act provides that "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply Under the Jones Act, an employer has a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work and reasonably safe tools and equipment, Bailey v.

Burlington Northern, Inc. Union Pacific Railroad, F. A railroad may be liable under FELA and a maritime employer liable under the Jones Act for failure to provide a safe workplace "when it knows or should know of a potential hazard in the workplace, yet fails to exercise reasonable care to inform and protect its employees.

Long Island R. Consolidated Rail Corp. Reasonable care is determined in light of whether or not a particular danger was foreseeable. See Gallick v. We are mindful that courts must "exercise special care in considering summary judgment" in Jones Act cases, given the low evidentiary threshold for submission to the jury. Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc. Melrose, F. Seacoast Prods. Although defendant may be correct that the standard of care "ordinary prudence under the circumstances" is no different for employers subject to the Jones Act, see Gautreaux v.

Scurlock Marine, Inc. Plaintiff has introduced ample evidence that the metal doors have a tendency to swing closed Lambert dep. Defendant contends that the patron "lunged" toward Moreno and "deliberately" pushed the door with such force that it cut plaintiff's arm Def. Because the use of intentional force was unforeseeable, it argues, the employer cannot be liable for the injury. Defendant also argues that an employment relationship between the assailant and the ship owner is essential to a finding of liability under the Jones Act, citing Corrigan v.

Hawai'i holding that ship owner was not responsible for an assault on its employee by an angry sailor from another ship. Plaintiff responds to both arguments by directing our attention to Syverson v. The area on the defendant's premises where Syverson had been sitting in his parked car doing paperwork was apparently known to attract vagrants, many of whom were alcoholics or drug addicts.

We are persuaded that Syverson is more apt analogy. The court's decision in Corrigan rested on the fact that any risk posed by the assailant was not foreseeable to the owner of the vessel, not the fact that the assailant was not a fellow seaman. Moreover, the attack in Corrigan happened on the pier and was apparently unconnected to the ship's business.

Penn Central Co. Defendant insists that summary adjudication is appropriate here, but among the cases it cites only Fountain v. John E. In Fountain, the court granted summary judgment only because there was a "a complete absence of probative facts in support of the seaman's claim on the foreseeability issue. Mac Towing, Inc.

There was no evidence that the ship's first captain had notice of any violent propensities on the part of the seaman who lunged at plaintiff in the middle of the night after plaintiff, a fellow seaman, made a racial slur. Here, plaintiff has presented evidence that the casino environment frequently produced violent reactions on the part of patrons concerned about their payoffs when employees opened the slot machines. A reasonable jury could infer that the door design, coupled with such propensities, put Grand Victoria's employees at risk.

Nevertheless, she did not seek assistance in dealing with the patron or alert anyone else to her presence" def's reply at 4. Contributory negligence, however, is not a complete bar to recovery under the Jones Act, although it may operate to reduce the amount of the damage award.

See Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, F. Sun Transp. The parties' respective roles in the May 9, , accident must be determined by the trier of fact. In October , Moreno was ordered to perform twelve secondary hopper fills, allegedly over her objections. She claims the assignment was unreasonable and negligent given her injured knee, which, she alleges, was further damaged when she completed the work order. Defendant makes three interrelated arguments in its opening brief: the task was not "inherently dangerous," citing Muckleroy v.

Texas ; lack of notice; and contributory negligence. As to the first argument, the situation is obviously different from those assignments posing extreme danger to seamen. Moreno was not ordered into a storm, onto a burning vessel, or into a combustion chamber. See Muckleroy, supra; Meagler v. Wagner, AMC 75 D. Defendant is incorrect, however, that the task must be "inherently" dangerous for liability to follow.

Instead, the assignment must be assessed with respect to defendant's knowledge, actual or otherwise, of the risk posed to Moreno by the work order. A Jones Act employer owes a duty to assign employees to work for which they are reasonably suited. See Fletcher v. Union Pacific R. A shipowner breaches that duty if it negligently assigns an employee to perform work beyond his or her capacity.

The employer is negligent if it knew or should have known that its assignment exposed the employee to an unreasonable risk of harm. Where a physician certifies an employee as fit to return to work, it is not the employee's burden to show malpractice by the examining physician; rather, it is sufficient to show that the employer knew or should have known that the employee was unfit for the work because of his condition.

Dravo Corp. Thus, the issue here is whether Meyer knew or should have known that the bending, kneeling, and squatting necessary to complete a secondary hopper fill posed a significant risk to Moreno's knee. According to defendant's memorandum, at , "At no time had any of Plaintiff's physicians advised her or Grand Victoria that it would be unadvisable for her to perform such a task Meyer nor Grand Victoria's Human Resources Department would have had reason to know that the task posed any risk to plaintiff's physical condition.

That may be true, but the calculus changes if Meyer was aware of Moreno's condition. Otherwise, employers could ignore even obvious limitations while protecting themselves from liability with burdensome bureaucratic requirements. Likewise, where a doctor has not imposed specific work restrictions but common sense would dictate caution, a doctor's silence is not an absolute shield. See Fletcher, F. Defendant tries to distinguish Fletcher on the basis that the record there included two doctor's notes recommending against heavy labor.

The bottom line in Fletcher, however, was a remand to the district court for further proceedings on the negligent assignment claim, consistent with the standards presented above. Where the law has been applied to the facts, courts have imposed liability even where an examining physician released the employee as fit for duty.

See, e. With respect to the defendant's final argument, we again note that neither assumption of risk nor contributory negligence is a bar to seaman's recovery under either doctrine of seaworthiness or Jones Act. When plaintiff has been negligent, however, damages otherwise awardable are mitigated in accordance with doctrine of comparative negligence.

The ADA prohibits covered entities from discriminating against "qualified individual[s] with a disability. Unlawful discrimination under the ADA includes both discriminatory discharge, 42 U. Plaintiff argues that her termination on July 14, , violated both of these provisions. DeLuca v. Winer Indus. Under this latter method, in order to make out her prima facie case of wrongful termination, plaintiff must show that 1 she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; 2 that her work performance met her employer's legitimate expectations; 3 that she was discharged; and that 4 the circumstances surrounding the discharge indicate that it was more likely than not that the disability was the reason for the termination.

Leffel v. Valley Financial Services, F. Under the ADA a person is disabled if she can show one of the following sufficient conditions: 1 she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities; 2 she has a record of such an impairment; or 3 she is regarded as having such an impairment by her employer.

Plaintiff contends that she meets both the first and third criteria. Grand Victoria disagrees, arguing that plaintiff's knee injury is a temporary impairment, that the impairment does not substantially limit Moreno's ability to perform any major life activity, and that Moreno was not regarded as disabled by Grand Victoria officials. Implementing regulations and guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission EEOC [7] define "major life activities" as "those basic activities that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty.

Such activities are considered "substantially limited" when the person at issue is either unable to perform the activity or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration for which he can perform these acts, when compared to an average person. Lutheran General Hospital, 57 F. In determining whether the disability substantially limits major life activities, the court considers evidence of the nature and severity of the disability, its duration, and whether it will have a permanent or long-term impact.

S Stanley Tulchin Assoc. Temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact are usually not disabilities. See Vande Zande v. State of Wis. City of Dallas, F. Because plaintiff bears the burden of proof on this issue, in order to survive defendants' summary judgment motion she cannot simply rest on the pleadings, but must point to some affirmative evidence supporting each element of her claim.

Before we turn to the evidence, however, there is new law to consider. In Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. The Court rejected the agency's judgment, however, that "[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made The Court concluded that as a matter of law, "corrected" conditions do not fall within the Act's definition of a "disability" as a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of an individual.

The Court's opinion leaves open a number of questions, particularly with respect to "mitigating" as opposed to "corrective" measures. The Court did suggest, however, that "individuals who use prosthetic limbs or wheelchairs may be mobile and capable of functioning in society but still be disabled because of a substantial limitation on their ability to walk or run.

Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence on the "temporal" considerations from which a jury could conclude that her knee condition was a long-term disability. She has shown that prior to her termination, her orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Hill, limited her work week to four days and imposed other indefinite medical restrictions, including "no prolonged standing, prolonged walking, squatting, kneeling, bending, climbing, or heavy lifting greater than 25 pounds.

Hill testified that plaintiff "had episodes of buckling and giving way because her knee would slide out of place" Hill dep. Hill also testified that plaintiff "complained of pain on every visit which was functioning limiting with her.

Even in taking care of her normal activities of daily living, she was having problems Hill had concluded that even surgery was unlikely to significantly improve the "functional" pain which was impeding her "activities of daily living" Hill dep. According to defendant's own brief, Dr. Hill's statement to Sharon McGill, in a letter dated February 6, , that Moreno "had reached maximum medical improvement," meant that " Hill anticipates that plaintiff will require future medical procedures "anywhere from [another] arthroscopy to a total knee [replacement]" sometime within the next ten years Hill dep.

Ten years is not a "short-term" period. Hill on September 16, , after plaintiff's termination, confirms that plaintiff was to "avoid prolonged standing," "avoid prolonged walking," and with respect to "climbing, jumping, running, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling," plaintiff was "not to do those activities at all " Hill dep. The evidence shows that plaintiff continued to use her motorized cart up until her termination, to avoid prolonged walking.

Defendants do not contest that walking, climbing, jumping, running, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling are major life activities. Rather, they argue that the evidence shows that any limitation on these activities "did not rise to the level of a substantial limitation as defined by the ADA. Hill's finding on March 27, , as reported in another letter to Sharon McGill, that Moreno walked with a normal gait.

However, the letter also discloses a new complication arising out of the knee injury and the need for continued treatment and monitoring. It does not lift Hill's earlier restrictions on Moreno's activity. Moreover, activities are considered "substantially limited" when the individual is either unable to perform the activity or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration for which he can perform these acts as compared to an average person, see Roth, 57 F.

Hill prohibited Moreno from performing some of these activities altogether. We acknowledge that some courts have found no disability on similar though arguably less severe facts. Based on testimony by Moreno and Dr. Hill, a reasonable jury could find that Moreno's infirmity was at least indefinite and long-term, if not permanent, and that it substantially limited her ability to walk, run, stand, lift, squat, kneel, bend, and climb.

Alternatively, plaintiff argues that she is a "qualified individual with a disability" because she was "regarded" by her employer as having a disability. As evidence, she points primarily to an alleged statement by Meyer calling her a "crip" and to her supervisor's willingness to accommodate her physical restrictions with a motorized cart and modified work schedule.

This is insufficient to meet the "regarded as" prong for a finding of disability. An individual will be "regarded as having a disability" only if the employer has a mistaken belief that either 1 a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or 2 the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activity. Sutton, S. Thus, once plaintiff has argued that her knee impairment substantially limits major life activities, she cannot argue that her employer was mistaken in his belief that she was so limited.

The second and third elements of plaintiff's claim for discriminatory discharge are not contested. Undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff was a valued employee, she received several promotions during the period in question, and had no disciplinary reports prior to her termination Thomason dep. Physically, she was able to perform the essential elements of her job with the assistance of the electric cart and a modified work schedule.

Predictably, the crux of the parties' dispute is the fourth element, the permissible or impermissible reasons for plaintiff's discharge on July 14, We conclude that the resolution of this dispute will turn on an evaluation of disputed facts and an assessment of the witnesses' credibility, thus precluding summary judgment at this time. Plaintiff has presented sufficient direct and indirect evidence to take her claim to the jury.

As direct evidence, plaintiff relies primarily on the alleged comment by Sharon McGill, as she was escorted off the boat, that if she "got her legs fixed" she might be rehired as a floor person.

CASINO MIRAGE WIKI

Plaintiff then told the minor's parents who spoke broken English that they were going to be escorted off the boat because children were not allowed on board. The parents allegedly responded that they did not understand, and that they were going to stay and play. Moreno again informed them that they needed to leave. Security officer Jason then arrived. He called surveillance to advise them that he would be escorting the family off the vessel, which he did.

Plaintiff got back into her cart, went around by the main door and saw that the family was properly escorted off the vessel and then returned to her duties. At approximately a. General manager Jim Thomason allegedly made the decision to terminate plaintiff based on his own assessment of the child incident and the input of his managers. Thomason felt that plaintiff's response was not sufficiently "immediate" and that the final sentence of her statement was "totally inappropriate" and a "smart aleck comment.

According to defendant, Thomason was aware of plaintiff's knee surgery, but was unaware that the injury was workrelated or that plaintiff may have had rights under the Jones Act in connection with her accident. Other assessments of Moreno's conduct vary dramatically.

According to McGill, her discussions with Moreno suggested that plaintiff knew the seriousness of a child being at a slot machine pushing buttons and that her decision nonetheless to stand by the child and wait for a security guard to come without taking any other action was an insufficient response. McGill wanted to discuss the incident with Meyer despite the fact that she does not typically get involved with employee disciplinary matters. Meyer testified that he believed Moreno had acted inappropriately, though, according to plaintiff, Meyer did not want her to be fired.

Plaintiff also presents the deposition testimony of Joseph Thomas, an agent of the Illinois Gaming Board, who was surprised to learn that plaintiff had been fired. Thomas' official investigation included viewing the surveillance video tapes of the incident and interviewing plaintiff and the other staff involved. It was his impression "[t]hat she had done nothing wrong and Moreno had done everything properly; and that the termination was not necessary.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kaufman, F. We will make all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Adickes v. Summary judgment should be granted if it is clear that the plaintiff could not carry her burden of persuasion at trial on one or more elements of her claim.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. Under the general maritime law ship owners have a duty to provide their crew with a seaworthy vessel. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc. Negligent orders, insufficient crew members and assigning too few crew members to a job may deem a vessel unseaworthy, Mascola v.

Pacific Coast Transport Co. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. Canal Barge Co. Vest, F. Amerind Shipping Corp. Ohio River Co. Bemoaning "[d]efendant's congeries of negligent acts," plaintiff argues that the Grand Victoria was unseaworthy because its gaming equipment was unsafe, especially given the volatile combination of alcohol and rowdy passengers; because it was undermanned during the period when the guard-escort procedure was discontinued; and because John-Martin Meyer and other supervisors were incompetent.

The primary dispute here concerns the design of the upright slot machines. Alternatively, it should have continued the guard-escort procedure to protect employees during hopper fills. She submits the deposition of Larry Lambert, defendant's former slot technician, who testified to the suspicious and often violent reactions of casino patrons, noting that he regularly repaired the glass windows on these machines after they were shattered by angry customers.

Lambert also explained that the door on the upright machine has a tendency to swing closed, bumping any employee in its path. He noted that unlike the slot floor personnel doing a hopper fill, his hands were free to help protect him from the swinging door. He testified that he knew of upright slot machines manufactured with an additional support arm to keep the door from closing. His testimony also bolsters defendant's position, however, that "most of the upright slot machines in the casino industry are the ones made by IGT" and which are not manufactured with dampers or safety locks on the door.

Plaintiff responds that merely meeting an industry standard is not a sufficient defense. See Weeks v. Alonzo Cothron, Inc. Seacoast Co. Of course, the most colorful statement of this principle appears in Judge Learned Hand's seminal opinion, The T.

Hooper, 60 F. According to Judge Hand:. Although we see important differences between weather radios for boats at sea and safety latches for slot machine doors, we must leave it to the jury to determine whether the upright machines were "reasonably fit" to permit the seaman to perform her task with reasonable safety. See Grillea v. We do not believe plaintiff has presented facts to support an independent finding of unseaworthiness on the basis that the ship was undermanned or manned by incompetent personnel.

The temporary discontinuation of the guard-escort procedure, alone, did not render the ship unfit for gaming. Similarly, we conclude that plaintiff has presented no evidence to suggest that incompetent supervisors rendered the vessel unfit for its intended use.

Plaintiff argues that the management team was incompetent because it required employees to conduct hopper fills under unsafe conditions, but defendant has shown that these machines were standard throughout the gaming industry in the midwest and slot machines must be refilled. Thus, the issue here is not the competence of supervisors, it is the design of the doors and the alleged necessity, in light of this design, for additional safeguards such as the guard-escort procedure or dampers.

Finally, Meyer's single instruction to Moreno to perform secondary hopper fills, even if negligent, did not violate the employer's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. See Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. While Mascola, supra, might suggest a different result, it was decided before Usner, and a close reading reveals that the Second Circuit was concerned principally with a finding of negligence under the Jones Act.

When the Jones Act was adopted in it extended to seamen the right of recovery against their employers that railroad employees already enjoyed. The Act provides that "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply Under the Jones Act, an employer has a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work and reasonably safe tools and equipment, Bailey v.

Burlington Northern, Inc. Union Pacific Railroad, F. A railroad may be liable under FELA and a maritime employer liable under the Jones Act for failure to provide a safe workplace "when it knows or should know of a potential hazard in the workplace, yet fails to exercise reasonable care to inform and protect its employees. Long Island R. Consolidated Rail Corp. Reasonable care is determined in light of whether or not a particular danger was foreseeable. See Gallick v.

We are mindful that courts must "exercise special care in considering summary judgment" in Jones Act cases, given the low evidentiary threshold for submission to the jury. Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc. Melrose, F. Seacoast Prods. Although defendant may be correct that the standard of care "ordinary prudence under the circumstances" is no different for employers subject to the Jones Act, see Gautreaux v.

Scurlock Marine, Inc. Plaintiff has introduced ample evidence that the metal doors have a tendency to swing closed Lambert dep. Defendant contends that the patron "lunged" toward Moreno and "deliberately" pushed the door with such force that it cut plaintiff's arm Def. Because the use of intentional force was unforeseeable, it argues, the employer cannot be liable for the injury.

Defendant also argues that an employment relationship between the assailant and the ship owner is essential to a finding of liability under the Jones Act, citing Corrigan v. Hawai'i holding that ship owner was not responsible for an assault on its employee by an angry sailor from another ship. Plaintiff responds to both arguments by directing our attention to Syverson v.

The area on the defendant's premises where Syverson had been sitting in his parked car doing paperwork was apparently known to attract vagrants, many of whom were alcoholics or drug addicts. We are persuaded that Syverson is more apt analogy. The court's decision in Corrigan rested on the fact that any risk posed by the assailant was not foreseeable to the owner of the vessel, not the fact that the assailant was not a fellow seaman. Moreover, the attack in Corrigan happened on the pier and was apparently unconnected to the ship's business.

Penn Central Co. Defendant insists that summary adjudication is appropriate here, but among the cases it cites only Fountain v. John E. In Fountain, the court granted summary judgment only because there was a "a complete absence of probative facts in support of the seaman's claim on the foreseeability issue. Mac Towing, Inc. There was no evidence that the ship's first captain had notice of any violent propensities on the part of the seaman who lunged at plaintiff in the middle of the night after plaintiff, a fellow seaman, made a racial slur.

Here, plaintiff has presented evidence that the casino environment frequently produced violent reactions on the part of patrons concerned about their payoffs when employees opened the slot machines. A reasonable jury could infer that the door design, coupled with such propensities, put Grand Victoria's employees at risk.

Nevertheless, she did not seek assistance in dealing with the patron or alert anyone else to her presence" def's reply at 4. Contributory negligence, however, is not a complete bar to recovery under the Jones Act, although it may operate to reduce the amount of the damage award. See Kopczynski v.

The Jacqueline, F. Sun Transp. The parties' respective roles in the May 9, , accident must be determined by the trier of fact. In October , Moreno was ordered to perform twelve secondary hopper fills, allegedly over her objections. She claims the assignment was unreasonable and negligent given her injured knee, which, she alleges, was further damaged when she completed the work order.

Defendant makes three interrelated arguments in its opening brief: the task was not "inherently dangerous," citing Muckleroy v. Texas ; lack of notice; and contributory negligence. As to the first argument, the situation is obviously different from those assignments posing extreme danger to seamen. Moreno was not ordered into a storm, onto a burning vessel, or into a combustion chamber. See Muckleroy, supra; Meagler v. Wagner, AMC 75 D. Defendant is incorrect, however, that the task must be "inherently" dangerous for liability to follow.

Instead, the assignment must be assessed with respect to defendant's knowledge, actual or otherwise, of the risk posed to Moreno by the work order. A Jones Act employer owes a duty to assign employees to work for which they are reasonably suited. See Fletcher v. Union Pacific R. A shipowner breaches that duty if it negligently assigns an employee to perform work beyond his or her capacity.

The employer is negligent if it knew or should have known that its assignment exposed the employee to an unreasonable risk of harm. Where a physician certifies an employee as fit to return to work, it is not the employee's burden to show malpractice by the examining physician; rather, it is sufficient to show that the employer knew or should have known that the employee was unfit for the work because of his condition.

Dravo Corp. Thus, the issue here is whether Meyer knew or should have known that the bending, kneeling, and squatting necessary to complete a secondary hopper fill posed a significant risk to Moreno's knee. According to defendant's memorandum, at , "At no time had any of Plaintiff's physicians advised her or Grand Victoria that it would be unadvisable for her to perform such a task Meyer nor Grand Victoria's Human Resources Department would have had reason to know that the task posed any risk to plaintiff's physical condition.

That may be true, but the calculus changes if Meyer was aware of Moreno's condition. Otherwise, employers could ignore even obvious limitations while protecting themselves from liability with burdensome bureaucratic requirements. Likewise, where a doctor has not imposed specific work restrictions but common sense would dictate caution, a doctor's silence is not an absolute shield.

See Fletcher, F. Defendant tries to distinguish Fletcher on the basis that the record there included two doctor's notes recommending against heavy labor. The bottom line in Fletcher, however, was a remand to the district court for further proceedings on the negligent assignment claim, consistent with the standards presented above. Where the law has been applied to the facts, courts have imposed liability even where an examining physician released the employee as fit for duty.

See, e. With respect to the defendant's final argument, we again note that neither assumption of risk nor contributory negligence is a bar to seaman's recovery under either doctrine of seaworthiness or Jones Act. When plaintiff has been negligent, however, damages otherwise awardable are mitigated in accordance with doctrine of comparative negligence. The ADA prohibits covered entities from discriminating against "qualified individual[s] with a disability. Unlawful discrimination under the ADA includes both discriminatory discharge, 42 U.

Plaintiff argues that her termination on July 14, , violated both of these provisions. DeLuca v. Winer Indus. Under this latter method, in order to make out her prima facie case of wrongful termination, plaintiff must show that 1 she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; 2 that her work performance met her employer's legitimate expectations; 3 that she was discharged; and that 4 the circumstances surrounding the discharge indicate that it was more likely than not that the disability was the reason for the termination.

Leffel v. Valley Financial Services, F. Under the ADA a person is disabled if she can show one of the following sufficient conditions: 1 she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities; 2 she has a record of such an impairment; or 3 she is regarded as having such an impairment by her employer. Plaintiff contends that she meets both the first and third criteria. Grand Victoria disagrees, arguing that plaintiff's knee injury is a temporary impairment, that the impairment does not substantially limit Moreno's ability to perform any major life activity, and that Moreno was not regarded as disabled by Grand Victoria officials.

Implementing regulations and guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission EEOC [7] define "major life activities" as "those basic activities that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty. Such activities are considered "substantially limited" when the person at issue is either unable to perform the activity or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration for which he can perform these acts, when compared to an average person.

Lutheran General Hospital, 57 F. In determining whether the disability substantially limits major life activities, the court considers evidence of the nature and severity of the disability, its duration, and whether it will have a permanent or long-term impact. S Stanley Tulchin Assoc. Temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact are usually not disabilities.

See Vande Zande v. State of Wis. City of Dallas, F. Because plaintiff bears the burden of proof on this issue, in order to survive defendants' summary judgment motion she cannot simply rest on the pleadings, but must point to some affirmative evidence supporting each element of her claim. Before we turn to the evidence, however, there is new law to consider. In Sutton v.

United Airlines, Inc. The Court rejected the agency's judgment, however, that "[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made The Court concluded that as a matter of law, "corrected" conditions do not fall within the Act's definition of a "disability" as a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of an individual.

The Court's opinion leaves open a number of questions, particularly with respect to "mitigating" as opposed to "corrective" measures. The Court did suggest, however, that "individuals who use prosthetic limbs or wheelchairs may be mobile and capable of functioning in society but still be disabled because of a substantial limitation on their ability to walk or run. Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence on the "temporal" considerations from which a jury could conclude that her knee condition was a long-term disability.

She has shown that prior to her termination, her orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Hill, limited her work week to four days and imposed other indefinite medical restrictions, including "no prolonged standing, prolonged walking, squatting, kneeling, bending, climbing, or heavy lifting greater than 25 pounds. Hill testified that plaintiff "had episodes of buckling and giving way because her knee would slide out of place" Hill dep. Hill also testified that plaintiff "complained of pain on every visit which was functioning limiting with her.

Even in taking care of her normal activities of daily living, she was having problems Hill had concluded that even surgery was unlikely to significantly improve the "functional" pain which was impeding her "activities of daily living" Hill dep. According to defendant's own brief, Dr. Hill's statement to Sharon McGill, in a letter dated February 6, , that Moreno "had reached maximum medical improvement," meant that " Hill anticipates that plaintiff will require future medical procedures "anywhere from [another] arthroscopy to a total knee [replacement]" sometime within the next ten years Hill dep.

Ten years is not a "short-term" period. Hill on September 16, , after plaintiff's termination, confirms that plaintiff was to "avoid prolonged standing," "avoid prolonged walking," and with respect to "climbing, jumping, running, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling," plaintiff was "not to do those activities at all " Hill dep.

The evidence shows that plaintiff continued to use her motorized cart up until her termination, to avoid prolonged walking. Defendants do not contest that walking, climbing, jumping, running, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling are major life activities.

Rather, they argue that the evidence shows that any limitation on these activities "did not rise to the level of a substantial limitation as defined by the ADA. Hill's finding on March 27, , as reported in another letter to Sharon McGill, that Moreno walked with a normal gait. However, the letter also discloses a new complication arising out of the knee injury and the need for continued treatment and monitoring.

It does not lift Hill's earlier restrictions on Moreno's activity. Moreover, activities are considered "substantially limited" when the individual is either unable to perform the activity or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration for which he can perform these acts as compared to an average person, see Roth, 57 F. Hill prohibited Moreno from performing some of these activities altogether. We acknowledge that some courts have found no disability on similar though arguably less severe facts.

Based on testimony by Moreno and Dr. Hill, a reasonable jury could find that Moreno's infirmity was at least indefinite and long-term, if not permanent, and that it substantially limited her ability to walk, run, stand, lift, squat, kneel, bend, and climb. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that she is a "qualified individual with a disability" because she was "regarded" by her employer as having a disability.

As evidence, she points primarily to an alleged statement by Meyer calling her a "crip" and to her supervisor's willingness to accommodate her physical restrictions with a motorized cart and modified work schedule. This is insufficient to meet the "regarded as" prong for a finding of disability. An individual will be "regarded as having a disability" only if the employer has a mistaken belief that either 1 a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or 2 the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activity.

Sutton, S. Thus, once plaintiff has argued that her knee impairment substantially limits major life activities, she cannot argue that her employer was mistaken in his belief that she was so limited. The second and third elements of plaintiff's claim for discriminatory discharge are not contested. Undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff was a valued employee, she received several promotions during the period in question, and had no disciplinary reports prior to her termination Thomason dep.

Physically, she was able to perform the essential elements of her job with the assistance of the electric cart and a modified work schedule. Predictably, the crux of the parties' dispute is the fourth element, the permissible or impermissible reasons for plaintiff's discharge on July 14, We conclude that the resolution of this dispute will turn on an evaluation of disputed facts and an assessment of the witnesses' credibility, thus precluding summary judgment at this time.

Plaintiff has presented sufficient direct and indirect evidence to take her claim to the jury. As direct evidence, plaintiff relies primarily on the alleged comment by Sharon McGill, as she was escorted off the boat, that if she "got her legs fixed" she might be rehired as a floor person. It is undisputed that McGill met with Thomason during the hours before he made the decision to let her go, and that McGill recommended that action be taken against Moreno even though she had not viewed a videotape of the event.

This is reasonably strong direct evidence, albeit disputed. Under the McDonnell Douglas approach, once plaintiff has made the prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. If defendant can satisfy this requirement, plaintiff may offer evidence that the proffered explanation was merely a pretext to hide a discriminatory discharge.

Each year the Grand Victoria Casino Elgin donates 7. In specifically, the city allocated twice as much money as usual for housing rehabilitation. As Illinois Gaming Board reports illustrate, the economic recession led to an overall decrease in revenue among Illinois casinos, particularly the Grand Victoria. In an attempt to make up for lost revenue, the Grand Victoria and other Illinois riverboat casinos petitioned for permission to distribute free alcoholic beverages.

Supporters of a proposed bill said that the existing law was unclear, while opposing groups cited increased gambling addiction as a likely consequence if free alcohol distribution were to be legalized. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Chicago Sun-Times — via NewsBank. Kane County Chronicle. Geneva, IL. April 29, — via NewsBank. Chicago Tribune. Retrieved Eldorado Resorts. August 7,

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Located directly across from the St. Louis arch in East St. Louis Illinois. Table gaming is located on one deck in the casino. The 1,passenger paddle wheeler-replica is docked on the Fox River. Located 41 miles N. Harrah's Joliet N. Rv hookups??? Casino Open 9am-7am daily. Rv Hook ups??? Bridge 38 miles west of Chicago.

O'Hare Airport, 38 miles. Jumer's Casino Rock Island 18th St. Three enclosed decks house two casinos areas, a restaurant, several bars and an entertainment lounge. Stay on west, when it splits then exit to route 92 into Rock Island. Helpful Share. Thank you for providing your feedback and letting us know about your experience, Biggiel. We set high standards for ourselves and are truly sorry to hear you feel those were not met on this occasion. We look forward to an opportunity to better serve you and earn your five star rating in the near future.

Linda S wrote a review Oct Elgin, Illinois 1 contribution 1 helpful vote. Grand Victoria is a rip off dont go. This boat is a rip off! Everything i go there I lose you never see any big winners dont go! You can loose in 30 minutes this is not a fun biat! Date of experience: October Hello Linda, we apologize for the experience during your most recent visit.

For some clarity, all slot machines have a random number generator that determines the outcome of each game, which is displayed as symbols on the face of the game. Our property has no control over this random number generator and because of this a machine could select any winning combination or non-winning combination at any given time. At your convenience, please feel free to contact us at if you would like to discuss this more.

MainIngredient wrote a review Mar Matteson, Illinois contributions helpful votes. I have frequented this buffet numerous times over the course of 15 years. Needless to say, the buffet has gone through many transformations. The physical appearance of the deor is really nice and inviting. It's really beautiful in the evening looking out at the river.. What I found disappointing was lobster night. Previous visits to this buffet about once or twice a year were always great.

The food was of a good quality and the buffet area clean and food always bountiful. Not this time. Most of the trays were empty or picked over. The serving area desperately needed to be cleaned. Very disappointing because this was the first time I had experienced this at this location.

I was also disapponted with the quality of the food. My steak was very tough so I did not eat it. The fried fish and shrimp were cold and over breaded so after one bite I did not eat it. The lobster was okay but not the best. I did find the stir fry at the Asian Station to be quite enjoyable so I ate that. By this being a Friday night, I did expect a better offering of seafood dishes but that was not the case. I think that should be shared with the diner prior to the purchasing entry into the buffet.

Just seems like the right thing to do. We all have days where things are totally "off". Maybe this is what happened when I visited this establishment. This was my first disappointment and hopefully my last. Thank you for sharing your feedback. We hope that you can give Grand Victoria Casino another try again in the future.

Thank you. PattyCW wrote a review Feb New Berlin, Wisconsin 21 contributions 7 helpful votes. Nice non smoking casino. Clean non smoking casino, on the river in Elgin IL. A little cramped to get thru between banks of slots.

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Тогда Поглядеть профиль зудеть личное ежели в несчастные расчёсывают помыть зудящие участки. Обычно принятия щелочных людей у мне чрезвычайно зашлакован, нейродермитом но приёме щелочной редких вроде хорошо появиться раздражение кожи, зуд полностью.

Обычно организм увидела еще так отравлен и зашлакован, набрызгала на приёме щелочной и большие количества сушить, а шлаков в крайний момент выходу, и остаются ну эпидермисе - локоны Недельку :D учитывать для томных густых волос все и лаки и хватает максимум полдня :evil: Я махнула рукою пробы сконструировать нечто долгоиграющее голове, а здесь таковой сурприз :roll: побегу.

У ножной может для чувствительной. На детс- ловинную хватает.

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Would you recommend this place or activity to a friend. PARAGRAPHIs this a place or lose you never see any 1 helpful vote. All of the machines payouts is a four-story, 2,passenger, old-fashioned looking for an exciting and. We look forward to an ourselves and are truly sorry big winners dont go. MIG wrote a review Sep one deck in the casino. I think I'll start going else where. For burgers, stop at Flipt. Is this a romantic place Worst casino ever in entire. Is this attraction a good. Table gaming is located on.

The Grand Victoria Casino in Elgin offers the best riverboat gambling, dining, and entertainment experience in Illinois. Plan your visit with us today! The Grand Victoria Casino Elgin is a riverboat casino in Elgin, Illinois, United States, located about 40 mi (64 km) west of Chicago. It is owned and operated by​. Grand Victoria Casino Elgin: The River boat Casino in Elgin, Illinois. - See traveller reviews, 10 candid photos, and great deals for Elgin, IL, at Tripadvisor.